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BANKRUPTCY, THE THRESHOLD OF CHANGE
RUSSELL

L.

HILLER*

Congress is endeavoring to enact comprehensive legislation
that will bring many changes to bankruptcy law. It is presently
studying two proposed bankruptcy bills: the Commission Bill,
proposed by a Congressionally established study commission;
and the Judges' Bill, submitted by the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges. The author compares the major significant
proposals of these two bills and analyzes their impact on reform

of bankruptcy law.
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I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Writing a new comprehensive bankruptcy act for a country with
a highly developed commercial and financial structure such as ours

is a colossal task. The subject matter to be considered is extensive,
detailed, and complex. One would imagine that any legislative body

would approach the task with considerable misgiving and reluctance. Yet from all present indications, it now appears quite probable that Congress in the relatively near future will enact comprehensive legislation that will bring many changes to our bankruptcy
system.
A number of fairly recent events makes such a forecast possible.
In 1970 Congress established a study commission' consisting of nine
members to conduct an in-depth, conceptual, and factual study of
the entire subject of bankruptcy. In July 1973, following extensive
hearings and independent studies, the Commission rendered its report.' The report consisted of three parts: Part I contained the find* Bankruptcy Judge (Retired) United States District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania; member of the National Bankruptcy Conference; past President of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges; former Digest Editor of the American Bankruptcy Law Journal; former member of the National Bankruptcy Seminar Committee and member of the
Seminar faculty; graduate of Duke University Law School (1936).
1. 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
2. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 137, 93d CONG., 1st Sess. (1973).
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ings and recommendations of the Commission; Part II contained the
full text of a new proposed bankruptcy statute to implement and
effectuate the Commission's work; and Part III comprised a collection of articles related to bankruptcy. Shortly thereafter the text of
Part II of the report was introduced in Congress as a proposed bill.
This bill has since become generally known as the Commission Bill2
Being of the opinion that some of the Commission's major proposals were improvident and unacceptable and could be improved
upon, the bankruptcy judges acting through the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, an organization of 50 years standing, set
about preparing their own proposals for comprehensive changes in
the bankruptcy system. In undertaking and planning this task, they
adopted the numerical sequence of sections as well as the subject
matter development that coincided substantially with that found in
the Commission Bill. The Judges' Bill was introduced in the Congress approximately 1 year later.4
In the 94th Congress these two bills' are the ones which both
House and Senate Judiciary Sub-Committees, along with their capable staffs of attorneys, are now seriously studying and comparing
with a view toward putting together a work product that can be
brought to an early vote in the committees. In January 1976 the
Senate Judiciary Sub-Committee completed its hearings, and in
March 1976 the comparable body inthe House completed its public
hearings. Both Committees are planning early mark-up sessions
with a view to producing a final product.
It is the limited intent and purpose of this article to compare
these two bills with reference to their major significant proposals.
An article of this limited dimension, dealing with so vast a subject,
of necessity requires a selection of material for treatment. Each bill
runs to nearly 300 pages of detailed subject matter. These bills and
the current Bankruptcy Act' provide persuasive evidence that the
subject of insolvency and bankruptcy comprises one of the most
pervasive and complex bodies of law in our system of jurisprudence.
In order to sharpen the perspective of this article a few comments about the present system of bankruptcy administration
should prove helpful. At the outset, one must not assume that the
present system of dealing with insolvency is wholly deficient and
outmoded. Such an assumption would be misleading. The present
system has evolved over a period of more than 75 years since the
3.
4.
5.
6.

H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 31].
Now H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 32].
H.R. 31 and H.R. 32.
11 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
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Bankruptcy Act of 18981 through many amendments for remedying
or improving specific areas, by a great store of judicial interpretation, and by experience with administration of bankruptcy under
that Act. Over a quarter of a million cases are now being administered annually under that system.' The subject of bankruptcy has

been under constant study and discussion for improvement by academic scholars, judges, and leading practitioners working through
such prestigious organizations as the American Bar Association, the
National Bankruptcy Conference, The National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges, and others. The subject is literally alive with
discussion and comment in law journals, law reviews, and other
legal periodicals.
Despite the increasing importance the subject is having for the
public generally, and for the legal profession in particular, bankruptcy administration in this country has always had an inherent
identity problem. This has been due in large part to the fact that
from the beginning Congress elected to place exclusive jurisdiction
over bankruptcy matters in the United States District Courts.
Bankruptcy was considered merely a segment of a much broader
spectrum of jurisdiction which Congress had given over the years to
these federal trial courts. For the most part, over the last 25 years,
the judges of the district courts have given only passing attention
to cases associated with their bankruptcy jurisdiction. The tasks
associated with bankruptcy administration were for the most part
delegated to their Referees in Bankruptcy who in earlier years exercised powers comparable with that of a Special Master. However,
in the Chandler Act Amendments of 19381 the powers of Referees
in Bankruptcy I0 were greatly enlarged and their responsibilities in7. 30 Stat. 544-66 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
8. ANNUAL REPORT" OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

152-53 (1975).
9. 52 Stat. 840-940 (1938).
10. Referees have been functioning as judges since the Chandler Act Amendments of
1938. Chapter I, section 1 of the Bankruptcy Act on Definitions specifies that the definition
for the term "court" whenever it is used throughout the Act means the judge (United States
District Judge) or the referee of the court of bankruptcy. Their jurisdiction and powers in
bankruptcy matters are co-equal with the exceptions noted in section 41(b) as to punishment
for contempts and in Chapter X Reorganizations.
Congress has neglected to change the designation of referees to that of judges. However,
in the early 1970's the United States Supreme Court promulgated new Bankruptcy Rules of
practice and procedure for Chapters I to VII of the Act which provide for the designation of
referees sitting as Bankruptcy Judges. Referees sitting as Bankruptcy Judges preside over the
Bankruptcy Courts and hear and determine (without jury) all matters and controversies that
may arise in a bankruptcy proceeding. Presently under 11 U.S.C. § 62(a) (1970) Bankruptcy
Judges are appointed for terms of 6 years by the judges of the United States District Court
in which they are to serve. Where the incumbent is performing satisfactorily, reappointment
is generally the rule.
COURTS
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creased. Following World War II when the credit system, especially
consumer credit, expanded rapidly with the enormous economic
growth of this country, the work and the number of Referees increased markedly. Nevertheless, whatever increase the bankruptcy
courts gained in regard and respect they always remained locked in
the subordinate position of being an integral part of the United
States District Courts-a court within a court.
But living creatures upon reaching maturity tend to want to be
on their own! Accordingly, both bills presently before the Congress
provide for taking bankruptcy out of the United States District
Courts and creating new and separate courts for the system. Each
bill would do this with different results. Thus both bills remedy the
long standing identity problem for the bankruptcy courts of this
country whether that result was intended or not. It is known, however, that in both bills these courts will be given greater dignity and
status in our judicial system. That is as it should be, for the subject
of bankruptcy has come of age.
II.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES

The Commission Bill" would create a new and separate bankruptcy court 2 in which bankruptcy judges would deal exclusively
with hearing and determining litigated matters. They would be relieved of all administrative duties with refernce to bankruptcy
cases. The judges of these courts would be appointed for 15-year
terms by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 3
The Commission anticipates that a lesser number than the present
220 bankruptcy judges would be required to operate the system.
Broad powers would be conferred upon these courts to hear and
determine all matters relating to bankruptcy. 4 Their jurisdiction
would be exclusive. Jury and non-jury trials would be authorized, 5
abolishing the present troublesome distinction between summary
and plenary jurisdiction. Under the Commission Bill, appeals from
these courts would be taken to the United States District Courts.
Further appeals would go in the usual manner to the Courts of
Appeal and to the Supreme Court."
The Judges' Bill would also give the judges of the new bank11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

H.R.
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §

31.
2-101.
2-102.
2-201.
2-207.
2-210.
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ruptcy courts a 15-year term,' 7 but, in an obvious endeavor to keep
these appointments out of the political arena, it is proposed that the
selection and appointments of judges for these courts be made by
the Judicial Councils of the Circuits. This was an obvious compromise of a sort. One would surmise that this proposal for appointment authority will not appeal to the Congress. During the hearings
on the bills the bankruptcy judges agreed to go along with the notion
of presidential appointments.
The Judges' Bill would also confer upon these courts the broadest subject matter jurisdiction. 9 However, the judges propose that
appeals from the bankruptcy court go directly to the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court, by-passing the District Court completely." The National Bankruptcy Conference joins in this proposal of direct appeal to the Courts of Appeal and the Commission
does not oppose.
In its studies and hearings the Commission found "substantial
reasons" '' for not involving the new bankruptcy judges with the
administrative detail commonly associated with all bankruptcy
cases. Under the present system when a bankruptcy case is instituted the bankruptcy judge does at least the following things. He
examines the petition, the accompanying schedules, and statement
of affairs to determine that they are complete and in proper order.
Similar scrutiny is given to other papers filed in the case. He presides over and conducts the first meeting of creditors as well as all
subsequent meetings. He examines the bankrupt and other witnesses, approves the election of trustees and committees of creditors, and appoints trustees when the creditors fail to elect. He authorizes the employment of counsel where necessary, as well as appraisers, accountants, and auctioneers to assist the trustee during
administration of the estate. He audits the accounts of trustees and
orders distribution.2' This and much more is done in addition to the
judicial duties the judge performs in hearing and determining all
contested and adversary matters which may arise during the case.
Under the Commission Bill all of the foregoing functions associated with administration are to be severed from those which are
17. H.R. 32, § 2-102.
18. Id. § 2-201.
19. Id. § 2-209.
20. The Commission believed that when Bankruptcy Judges participate in the prior
administrative aspects of bankruptcy proceedings, it tends to impair the litigants' confidence
in the impartiality of the court's decision. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF THE BANKRUPTCY
LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1973).
21. Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. §§ 44(a), 67, 72 (1970); Bankruptcy Rules 209(b), 21516, 11 U.S.C. app. (Supp. V 1975).
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purely judicial in all liquidation and wage earner cases. To accomplish this change the Commission proposes that a new agency be
created by the Congress in the executive branch of the government
to be known as the United States Bankruptcy Administration.2 2
This agency would have its central office in the nation's capital,
regional offices at strategic locations throughout the country, and
hundreds of local offices to facilitate easy access by the public. 3
The Administrator of this agency would be appointed, without
regard to political affiliation, by the President for a term of 7 years.
There would be a limited number of appointments by the Administrator for high level offices in the administration, all serving at his
pleasure. The remaining officers and staff throughout the country
would be graded appointments under Civil Service. 4
This proposal is one of the Commission's most controversial
recommendations. If adopted by Congress this would mark the first
time in United States' history that the executive branch of government has had a direct part in bankruptcy administration. Bankruptcy, in all its aspects, has always been a part of the judicial
branch of government. There are many who believe that Congress
is not inclined to create new major agencies in the executive branch
at a time when public opinion appears to strongly favor reducing the
number of government agencies. Moreover, even if that were not so,
it does not appear that enough evidence has been produced by the
Commission to induce the Congress to remove bankruptcy from its
traditional setting in the judicial branch. The National Bankruptcy
Conference, to which some of the Commission belong, recommends
that the agency remain within the judicial branch.
In developing its idea for this agency the Commission proposes
that all bankruptcy cases when instituted be filed with the agency
rather than with the clerks of the courts as under present practice."
Where the petitioner is an individual with regular income the Administrator, acting through his subordinates, would counsel the petitioner as to the relief available to him under various chapters of
the act." The legal profession has been highly critical of this proposal authorizing an executive agency of government to counsel and
give legal advice.
Following a filing the Administrator would have complete juris22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

H.R. 31, § 3-101.
Id. § 3-103.
Id. § 3-102.
Id. § 4-202(b).
Id. § 4-203.
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diction over all elements of bankruptcy administration. 7 His agency
would prepare and dispatch all notices to creditors required during
the proceedings." Creditors would file their claims where required
with the Administrator." The Administrator would automatically
become the trustee in all cases'" and would take custody and control
of the debtor's assets, set aside claimed exemptions and inventory,
and appraise and sell the assets, all under staff supervision and
control. He would collect all moneys of the estate, including filing
fees, and deposit them in the Treasury of the United States in a
fund to be known as the "Bankruptcy Administration Fund."', The
agency itself would operate with funds appropriated by the Congress. The Administrator would fix all fee schedules and charges
assessed against each estate.2 His office would also make the distribution to creditors.
There would be no meetings of creditors, except in those instances where a majority of creditors holding at least 35 percent in
amount of the unsecured debt make written request to vote for a
private trustee.33 In all other cases the trustee would be the Administrator as public trustee. Except in cases where a private trustee is
requested in the manner set forth above, creditors in their notice
from the Administrator would merely be informed of the institution
of the bankruptcy case by a named debtor, the nature of the proceeding, the place where the debtor's schedules are filed and may
be seen, the time permitted for requesting the election of a private
trustee, the time and place for filing proofs of claim, if such are to.
be filed, and the legal effect which the proceedings have for the stay
of civil actions and the enforcement of liens and judgments against
the debtor. The notice may also contain the time fixed for filing
objections to discharge or complaints to determine the dischargeability of specific debt.3
This agency for centralized administration would be authorized
and expected to employ the latest techniques in computer processing of all data in the cases being administered, including printouts
of standardized notices to creditors and routine standardized administrative orders.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. § 4-301.
Id. §§ 4-307 to -308.
Id. § 4-401.
Id. § 4-304.
Id. § 3-301.
Id. § 3-302.
Id. § 5-101.
Id. § 4-307.
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In short, the entire congeries of duties associated with bankruptcy administration would be centered in the proposed agency.
Only when any contested or adversary matter arises is the matter
then referred by the agency to the bankruptcy court for determination. Under the Commission Bill the new bankruptcy courts would
have a function that is purely judicial, nothing else.
Both bills would accord to the new bankruptcy courts the
broadest jurisdiction to entertain, hear, and determine all matters
relating to bankruptcy. However, in the Commission Bill jurisdiction over Railroad Reorganizations is left with the United States
District Courts where such jurisdiction now resides.35 On the other
hand, the Judges' Bill provides that Railroad Reorganizations shall
be a part of the exclusive jurisdiction of the new bankruptcy
courts .3

There can be little doubt that the Commission in making its
proposal for separating administrative and judicial functions was
influenced considerably by the striking statistic that each year approximately 90 percent of all bankruptcy cases filed throughout the
country are consumer oriented. 31 Commonly these cases have few or
no assets to distribute to creditors after setting aside debtors' exemptions; business assets are not involved. The Commission was
obviously looking for an administrative system that would deal
effectively with this large body of cases. A considerable portion of
these cases, however, are centered in about a dozen states.
The Judges' Bill leaves the new bankruptcy courts with many
of their present characteristics insofar as their function is concerned. 8 The bill proposes that these courts be located in convenient places throughout the country with regions that are not necessarily coterminus with those of the District Courts. Their locations
would be determined following a survey. They would be staffed as
they now are with clerks, with whom petitions would be filed initially, who would keep and maintain the records, and prepare and
dispatch all notices to creditors. These courts would retain their
present responsibilities of supervision and control over administration of the cases before them and exercise the broadest jurisdiction
to hear and determine all matters relating to bankruptcy. The court
would be staffed with court reporters, bailiffs, and law clerks. Jury
and non-jury trials would be conducted. The distinction between
35. Id. § 2-201.
36. H.R. 32, § 2-201.
37. ANNUAL REPORT OF TIIE DIRECTOR OF TIIE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

152-53 (1975).
38. H.R. 32, §§ 2-101 to -209.
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summary and plenary jurisdiction would be abolished.
Under the Judges' Bill a certain amount of supervision and
administrative correlation would be centered in a "Bankruptcy
Branch" in the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 9
The clerks of the courts and the trustees in each case would remit
all moneys coming into their hands to the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, who would be charged
with their management and investment in interest bearing deposits
or in short-term government securities. 0 Many millions of dollars
would be involved in this fund at all times. Distributions in each
case would be made from this fund.
The Judges' Bill rejects the idea of a public trustee in all liquidation and wage earner type cases as proposed by the Commission.
The Judges propose that a panel of qualified persons be named by
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States

Courts to serve as trustees. 4 Each individual named would have to
have an office or residence in or adjacent to the territory to be served
by a bankruptcy court. If authorized by its charter, a corporation
could also qualify for the panel. The Director would make the appointment of the trustee in all liquidation cases. In other cases the
court could also direct the Director to appoint a trustee.
It can readily be seen that both bills have rejected and abandoned the principle of "creditor control." Those familiar with the
way creditor control works in actual bankruptcy practice must concede that the democratic system of creditor participation has been
an unachieved ideal. Lack of broad based creditor attendance and
participation in meetings of creditors throughout the proceedings
has been the prime cause of the failure of that system. Whether the
public trustee idea or the rotating panel of qualified trustees selected by an agency rather than by the creditors or by the courts is
going to produce a better system only time will tell.
It should not be assumed, however, that the Congress will limit
its selection to one or the other of the new or modified concepts set
forth in these two bills. There will be some tradeoffs in the legislative process, and the Congress may be expected to come up with
some ideas of its own. The public hearings conducted by the two
sub-committees have produced critical comments and alternate
proposals. The National Bankruptcy Conference has proposed numerous modifications for both bills. Experience has confirmed what
39. Id. § 3-101.
40. Id. §§ 3-102 to -103.
41. Id. § 4-301.
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was said at the outset-writing a new comprehensive bankruptcy
act is a collossal task.
III.

SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES

While the structural changes proposed for the new bankruptcy
system are most important the proposals for substantive change
deserve considerable attention as well. Again it is necessary to be
selective.
State law is preempted in such areas as the debtor's exemption,
inchoate dower and courtesy interests, spendthrift trusts, and for
ipso facto termination clauses in leases. The law of preferences has
been modified to simplify its proof, as has the order of priorities
among claims. The Uniform Commercial Code has been brought
into better correlation with bankruptcy with respect to preferences.
The legal effect of a discharge is strengthened to avoid and prevent reaffirmation of a discharged debt. The provability of a claim
would no longer be essential to its allowance. The concept of unconscionability has been borrowed from the Uniform Commercial
Code as one of the grounds for disallowance of a claim. The government's priority for tax claims would be greatly limited, and property
of the estate would no longer be measured by leviability and transferability under state law as it is at present. This brief recital constitutes but a small part of the long list of substantive changes that
are to be found in both bills, many of which will surely find their
way into the new act. An attempt will be made to look more closely
at a few of these subjects.
In the area where state law would be preempted both bills
propose a national debtors exemption law for bankrupt debtors."
The proposals are broad and lengthy. In general the Commission
would grant an individual debtor a homestead exemption up to
$5000 plus $500 for each dependent. The Judges' Bill would allow
$6000 plus $600 for each dependent. Where the homestead does not
exhaust the allowable limit, the balance could be allocated to other
property of the debtor, but with an outside limit of $25,000 for all
categories. If the exemption allowed by state law was greater, the
debtor could elect to claim it instead. Both bills contain a long list
of property which may be claimed as part of the exemption in addition to the homestead, including such items as alimony, support
and maintenance, benefits or proceeds from life insurance, pensions, annuities, income tax refunds, livestock, and cash or receivables to a limit of $500.
42. H.R. 31, § 4-503; H.R. 32, § 4-503.
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The proposed federal preemption of state exemption laws in
bankruptcy constitutes a new area for federal intrusion. Most recently the government has done the same thing on the subject of
garnishment of wages." The effect here would be to bring uniformity
to an area of law that has had great disparity. Under current bankruptcy law state exemption laws are applicable. How well the proposed system would work is difficult to foretell. What is certain,
however, is that under the proposed liberalized system there would
be few cases with dividends for creditors after setting aside exemptions. Valid security would generally consume what is left.
Both bills contain a provision making unenforceable a waiver
of exemptions in favor of a creditor who does not hold valid security
in property. Likewise, a lien obtained by legal or equitable proceedings and one created by agreement to give security on wearing apparel, household goods, and health aids, other than a purchase
money obligation, would also be unenforceable against property allowed as exempt.
Under the present Bankruptcy Act one of the grants of power
to the bankruptcy courts is to
determine and liquidate all inchoate or vested interests of the
bankrupt's spouse in the property in any estate whenever, under
the applicable laws of the State, creditors are empowered to compel such spouse to accept a money satisfaction for such interest."
Both bills contain provisions that would terminate all such marital
interests in property of the estate as of the date the petition is filed, 5
where such property has not been set aside as part of the exemption
or abandoned as burdensome.
Another example where the federal government in exercise of
its bankruptcy powers would preempt an area left previously to the
states is that of spendthrift trusts.46 Generally, these are donor instruments, inter vivos or testamentary, which establish trusts in
property with provisions insulating principal and income from the
donee-beneficiary's creditors, and restrict or forbid alienation or
anticipation by the donee-beneficiary of his interest by assignment,
pledge, or other devise. Where the amount of property and income
that is protected by these trusts is large, a beneficiary's bankruptcy
could prove most awkward. Accordingly, both bills take care of this
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1671 (1970).
11 U.S.C. § 11(7) (1970).
H.R. 31, § 4-601(c); H.R. 32, § 4-601(c).
H.R. 31, § 4-601(b); H.R. 32, § 4-601(b).
G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 40 (5th ed. 1973).
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possible loophole. The insulating provisions of such a trust are enforceable against the beneficiary's bankruptcy trustee only to the
extent of the income therefrom which is found by the bankruptcy
court to be reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and
his dependents. The actual mechanics of dealing with such a trust
have yet to be worked out.
An additional provision having to do with property of the estate

which would have the effect of preempting gtate law igthe enforcea.
bility of a provision in a contract or lease which ipso facto terminates or permits a party other than the debtor to terminate the
contract or lease because of the insolvency of the debtor, or the
commencement by or against him of a bankruptcy case." Both bills

would permit such provisions in a contract or lease to be enforceable
in liquidation proceedings, but not in wage earner plan,4" arrangement, 0 and reorganization5 ' cases. In the latter three situations,
however, unenforceability is conditioned upon all defects in performance being cured and adequate assurance for future performance provided.
The voidability and recovery of preferential transfers of money
or property have always provided troublesome problems of proof
for the bankruptcy trustee. Under present law his burden is substantial. In order to avoid a claimed preference the trustee must
show: (1) a transfer of property by conveyance, assignment, sale,
payment, pledge, lien or encumbrance, or other device; (2) to or for
the benefit of a creditor; (3) for or on account of an antecedent debt;
48. H.R. 31, § 4-602(b); H.R. 32, § 4-602(b).
49. A wage earner plan is one proposed by a petitioner under chapter XIII of the Act.
An individual who qualifies as a wage earner as defined in the chapter proposes a plan calling
for a composition or extension of his unsecured debts to be paid out of future earnings. If the
proposed plan merely extends the time for paying the indebtedness, as it frequently does, the
petitioner undertakes to pay 100 percent of his unsecured indebtedness. In those cases where
the petitioner obtains written consents to his proposal from a majority both in number and
amount of his unsecured creditors, the plan comes before the court for confirmation following
a hearing held upon notice to all creditors. After confirmation the plan is binding upon the
debtor and on both consenting and nonconsenting unsecured creditors. Where the plan proposes a composition of debt or a composition and extension, the wage earner undertakes to
pay a stated percentage of his unsecured debt over a period of time out of future earnings.
The confirmation procedure for such a plan is the same as for simple extension.
50. Arrangements are another form of debtor relief and rehabilitation. These proceedings
are instituted by individuals and corporations under chapter XI of the Act. Composition and
extension of unsecured debt is the subject matter of the proceeding. Confirmation of a plan
accepted in writing by a majority in number and amount of the creditors affected by the plan
is binding upon all classes of creditors affected whether or not they accepted the plan.
51. Corporate reorganizations are effected under chapter X of the Act. The chapter is
employed for debtor relief and rehabilitation only in the larger corporate cases. The plan
usually affects not only trade indebtedness, whether secured or unsecured, but also indebtedness related to the corporation's capital structure, which affects security holders.
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(4) made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent; (5) within four
months before the filing of a petition initiating a proceeding by or
against him under the Act; (6) the effect of which transfer would
enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
some other creditor of the same class; and (7) the creditor or his
agent acting with reference thereto had at the time when the transfer was made reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. 2
The Commission Bill cuts the period of time to 3 months,53
whereas the Judges' Bill retains the 4 month period. In both bills
the preference voidability is one year where the creditor obtaining
the transfer is a so-called "insider" by being a member of the
debtor's immediate family, a partner, an affiliate, a director, officer,
or managing agent of or for the debtor.55 A number of transactions
are excepted from preference voidability in both bills. Among these
are enabling loans and security interests on inventory and accounts
receivable. Statutory liens and common law liens are also excepted."
The priorities for many classes of claims have been drastically
altered in both bills. 8 Under current law debts that are accorded
priority in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors are the
following: (1) the costs and expenses of administration; (2) wages
and commissions earned within 3 months prior to bankruptcy up to
a limit of $600 for each claimant; (3) reimbursement of the costs and
expenses of one or more creditors whose efforts defeated confirmation of an arrangement or wage earner plan, or whose objections to
discharge resulted in the discharge being refused, revoked, or set
aside; (4) taxes; (5) debts other than for taxes owing to the United
States or to any person who by the laws of the United States is
entitled to priority; and (6) rent owing to a landlord entitled to
priority by applicable state law, but limited to rent that is legally
due and owing for actual use and occupancy of the premises and
which accured within 3 months of bankruptcy.
Under both bills these priorities would be the following: (1)
administrative costs and expenses; (2) amounts due on transactions
with a involuntary bankrupt prior to adjudication; (3) compensation for personal services, including vacation, severance, and sick52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

11 U.S.C. § 96 (a)(1),(2) (1970).
H.R. 31, § 4-607(a)(1).
H.R. 32, § 4-607(a)(1).
H.R. 31, § 4-607(a)(2); H.R. 32, § 4-607(a)(2).
H.R. 31, § 4-607(c)(1),(d); H.R. 32, § 4-607(c)(1),(d).
H.R. 31, § 4-607(b); H.R. 32, § 4-607(b).

58. H.R. 31, § 4-405;

H.R. 32, § 4-405.

59. 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1970).
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leave pay, earned within 3 months of bankruptcy up to a limit of
$1200 for each claimant; (4) contributions to employee benefit plans
based on 1 year of service prior to the employer's bankruptcy, not
to exceed $300, or the difference between $1200 and what was paid
to the claimant as a priority wage, whichever is the lesser amount;
(5) taxes due the United States, any state, or any subdivision
thereof, generally for 1 year, and taxes withheld from wages; (6) all
other claims not subordinated by any of the provisions of the act;
(7) tardily filed claims that are not subordinated in payment; (8)
interest on claims (it is not clear from the draft of these bills whether
either allows interest on claims promptly filed and also on tardily
filed claims); (9) claims subject to subordination."
It can easily be seen that the proposed ladder of priorities is
much more pervasive and complicated than those under the present
statute. It is a fair assumption that Congress will alter a number of
these categories for this is the area where contest and competition
exists. The Treasury Department will certainly be heard from since
its tax priority would be cut down from 3 years to 1 year. It is also
noted that the landlord's priority is eliminated entirely. Congress
will certainly hear from that group. Thus substantial revision of this
section is to be expected.
As to discharges, under both bills the legal consequences of a
bankruptcy discharge would be greatly strengthened by declaring
the discharged debt completely extinguished. ' Under current law a
discharged debt merely gives the debtor an affirmative defense in a
suit brought on the debt. "2 This, however, is accompanied by a
provision of the Act (a provision also found in Bankruptcy Rule 404
(f)) prescribing that the Order of Discharge shall declare any judgment theretofore or thereafter obtained on a discharged debt in any
court to be null and void. "3
Both bills provide that notwithstanding any other law to the
contrary, a debt extinguished by discharge shall not be revived or
reaffirmed or be all or any part of any bargain creating a new debt.
This would foreclose attempts by creditors in the future to evade the
discharge barrier."
It seems clear from the foregoing that the drafters of this provision were reaching out for the strongest and most affirmative language they could find to assure that the discharge under the new act
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

H.R. 31, § 4-405; H.R. 32, § 4-405.
H.R. 31, § 4-507; H.R. 32, § 4-507.
11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970).
11 U.S.C. § 32(f)(1) (1970).
H.R. 31, § 4-507; H.R. 32, § 4-507.
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would be as genuine and trustworthy as man could devise. This had
been a troublesome area until several years ago. Suits brought to
recover a debt after bankruptcy cases were closed was a common
ploy. All too often these suits were not defended. Default judgments
frequently resulted, with the debtor losing some or all of the benefits
he sought in bankruptcy. A similar result occurs when there is reaffirmation of debt. It is quite common under present practice for a
bankrupt to reaffirm a debt that affects his essential household
goods, motor vehicle, and clothing.
Under current law the commencement of a proceeding within
6 years following an earlier bankruptcy in which the debtor has
obtained a discharge or in which he had a composition in an arrangement or wage earner plan confirmed is a bar to a discharge in
the subsequent proceeding." Under both bills this time for successive bankruptcies is reduced to 5 years. However, under the Commission Bill the 5-year bar would not apply where the proceedings
were under a wage earner plan. Numerous other changes are proposed in this area of successive bankruptcy.
New criteria for the allowance of claims is set forth in both bills
in considerable detail. Under the present Act all claims which have
been duly proved are to be allowed by the court upon their receipt
or presentation. 7 This requirement for both proof and allowance of
claims was modified a few years ago by Bankruptcy Rule 306(b)
which provides that a claim filed in accordance with the Rules
"shall be deemed allowed" for the purpose of distribution unless an
objection thereto has been filed by a party in interest. Under the
bills now before the Congress the requirement of provability is abolished."6 Indeed the requirement for filing claims at all has been
greatly limited under both bills.
Regarding the allowance and disallowance of claims, both bills
introduce a new concept which was borrowed from the Uniform
Commercial Code. It is the concept of unconscionability as a ground
for disallowance. In reaching a decision the courts may without
limiting the scope of the concept consider the following elements as
being pertinent to the issue: (1) the degree to which unfair advantage was taken of the debtor in any aspect of the transaction that
gave rise to the claim, because of the debtor's lack of knowledge,
ability, experience, or physical or mental capacity; (2) the substan65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(5) (1970).
H.R. 31, § 4-505(a)(7); H.R. 32, § 4-505(a)(7).
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tial disparity between the price of the goods or services and their
value as measured by the price of the same or comparable goods or
services generally prevailing in the debtor's community at the time;
and (3) the definitions of unconscionability found in the statutes,
regulations, rulings, and decisions of federal and state legislative,
administrative, and judicial bodies. The Commission would restrict
the application of the foregoing doctrine to claims filed in consumer
cases; the Judges' Bill would extend the doctrine apparently to all
bankruptcy cases.
The time allowed creditors to file claims differs in each bill. The
present Act allows claims to be filed for a period of 6 months after
the first date set for the first meeting of creditors.70 Upon application, the court may allow an extension of the 6-month period to the
United States and any state or subdivision thereof provided it is
done before the initial period expires.7 ' The Commission Bill sets no
time for filing claims, leaving it to the Administrator to fix both the
time and the place in each case in the first notice to creditors." No
doubt this would be determined in the regulations to be adopted
and promulgated by the Administrator. On the other hand the
Judges' Bill fixes the time by statute at 3 months after the first date
set for the first meeting of creditors.73 Both bills provide for extensions of time to taxing agencies on terms similar to the ones now in
force.
The 3 month period for filing claims found in the Judges' Bill
seems sound. The 6 month period under present law is too long and
appears to be a holdover from earlier times in this country when the
general pace of things was slower and transportation and communication less sophisticated. It is a reasonable expectation that the
time for filing claims will be shortened considerably.

IV.

BusINESs

REHABILITATION CHANGES

Until now this selective commentary has said little or nothing

about the rehabilitative portions of the two bills. These are the socalled chapter cases as distinguished from ordinary liquidation
bankruptcy. While it is true that the wage earner plan cases are
rehabilitative in their concept and characteristics, they have been
alluded to in the earlier discussion of the consumer type bankruptcy
and consequently no further comment of them is made here. This
70.
71.
72.
73.

It U.S.C. § 93(n) (1970).
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H.R. 31, § 4-401.
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section will look briefly at what the two bills propose in the important area of the distressed business that resorts to a chapter case
when it needs relief under the bankruptcy act.
Under the present Bankruptcy Act the relief provided for the
rehabilitation of business debtors is found in three separate
chapters: chapters X, XI, and XII. Of the three, chapter X is the
most pervasive remedy. Both capital and trade indebtedness can be
modified under its provisions and procedures. It is generally adaptable to the ills of the larger business corporations. Of all the chapter
cases, however, the one most widely used is chapter XI providing
for unsecured debt adjustment for individuals, partnerships, and
corporations. Chapter XII is utilized the least; it is not available as
a remedy to corporations, and it deals solely with adjustment of
debt secured by real estate.
The Commission Bill would consolidate all three chapters into
one. 4 The Judges' Bill would retain the distinction between business reorganizations and arrangements," which would mean a consolidation only of the remedies found currently in chapters XI and
XII. Thus, plans for an arrangement could provide for the extension
or composition of unsecured debt as well as debt secured by real or
personal property.
Both bills undertake to eliminate almost entirely the need for
filing proofs of claim in the reorganization and arrangement cases.
This is accomplished by requiring the trustee or debtor-inpossession to file early in the proceeding with the court or
Administrator a compete inventory or schedule of the debtors property, a list of his creditors, and a list of his equity security holders."
The list of the names, addresses, and amounts due creditors would
provide the court or the Administrator with the information required to prepare and mail the required notices. Both bills provide
for discretion in requiring the filing of claims.
The Commission's proposal for consolidation of the three chapters into one and the other proposals that are a consequence of it
have caused considerable alarm among experienced practitioners
and the Judges. The Commission justifies its proposal for consolidation of all business rehabilitation cases by pointing out in its report
that under present law the three chapters have detailed and often
overlapping rules regarding availability of business rehabilitation.
The Commission further maintains that much of what occurs proce74. H.R. 31, §§ 7-101 et seq.
75. H.R. 32, §§ 7-101, -201.
76. H.R. 31, § 7-103(a)(2); H.R. 32, § 7-103(a)(2).
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durally in each of the chapters can be dealt with flexibly under one
chapter. While there is much to be said for this latter point, one may
question whether the Congress will consolidate the whole important
subject of business rehabilitation. In this regard, the Judges' Bill
appears more realistic. Since the Chandler Act Amendments of 1938
were added to the Act expanding the concept of bankruptcy from
one of liquidation to include rehabilitation as well, the importance
of bankruptcy as a legal tool to assist a business in financial distress
has grown tremendously. In the hands of knowledgable and resourceful counsel these chapters have been the salvation of many
distressed business enterprises. The validity and viability of such
cases as an integral part of the bankruptcy scheme have been well
established and justified in the bankruptcy forum over the past 35
years.
The Commission's proposal for a single consolidated rehabilitation chapter (Railroad Reorganizations are excluded) would allow
the bankruptcy court discretion (where the indebtedness is less than
$1 million) to retain the debtor in possession or to request the Bankruptcy Administration to supply the court with the name of a person
from its regular panels to be appointed trustee." In this manner the
court is removed from the selection process in trustee appointments.
Where the debt exceeds $1 million and there are 300 or more
public security holders, a presumption arises that a trustee is required and one is appointed. However, where the expense involved
in such an appointment is deemed to be disproportionate to the
protection afforded, the court may dispense with a trustee and leave
the debtor in possession.7" Receivers are eliminated entirely in rehabilitation cases. The Judges' Bill contains comparable provisions.79
The practice under the present Act of having creditors elect an
official creditors committee to participate in negotiations with the
debtor and perform other functions'" is considerably altered in the
Commission Bill."' The Commission instead would have an official
creditors committee composed of the largest creditors appointed by
the Bankruptcy Administration. If there were conflicting creditor
interests the Administrator could appoint a committee for each
class of creditors. Provision is also made for unofficial creditors'
committees but the reimbursement of their expenses is not assured.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

H.R. 31, § 7-102(a).
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The Judges' Bill contains provisions which are very similar.2
The institution of an involuntary bankruptcy against a defending debtor has frequently been a time-consuming experience. This
has been true whether the proceedings contemplated a liquidation
or a corporate reorganization under chapter X. The burden of proof

associated with establishing insolvency and the commisgion of an
Act of Bankruptcy have often discouraged creditors from commencing the action, leaving the debtor to dissipate or otherwise deplete
the assets. Not infrequently a defending debtor would also demand
a jury trial of the issues. Delay and expense were the result.
The Commission Bill attempts to deal with this problem in a
bold and forthright manner. It proposes to abolish the concept of
"Acts of Bankruptcy" and eliminates the need for petitioning creditors to prove insolvency of the debtor. Instead, the bill proposes that
after a showing that the debtor has ceased to pay his debts or is
unable to pay his current obligations, a presumption of insolvency
arises which the debtor has the burden of overcoming with evidence,
and his right to a jury trial is no longer available. It is also provided
that if the debtor had made a general assignment for the benefit of
creditors or suffered the imposition of a general receivership, either
in itself would be sufficient to support an involuntary petition in
bankruptcy without regard to the issue of insolvency or ability to
pay. -'
Under the Act currently in force three or more creditors having
unsecured claims aggregating $500 in amount may become petitioners for an involuntary bankruptcy.8 4 Both bills raise this qualifying
amount to $2500 for involuntary liquidation cases and fix $10,000
as the amount of claims necessary to institute an involuntary reorganization case."
While the contested case is pending, the court may allow the
Bankruptcy Administration to take immediate possession in order
to preserve the debtor's property. During the interim period between the filing of such a petition and the determination of the
issues by the court, persons dealing with the debtor are protected
on transactions in the ordinary course, and the Bankruptcy Administration is authorized to give express approval to specific transactions out of the ordinary."
82.
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84.
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In chapter X corporate reorganization cases under the present
Act, where the indebtedness exceeds $3 million the court is required
to notify the Securities and Exchange Commission of any plan for
the adjustment of debt and to request a report. 7 The Commission
Bill would change this requirement by providing that in all cases
where the proposed plan would materially and adversely affect 300
or more persons holding securities, the Bankruptcy Administration
would be called upon for a report regarding any plan that was to be
submitted to creditors." The Commission justified this proposed
change by claiming that the participation of the Securities and Exchange Commission in reorganization matters was "tangential" to
its main statutory mission, whereas the Bankruptcy Administration
would be familiar with and intimately involved in all bankruptcy
matters. The Judges' Bill on the other hand leaves the report function with the Securities and Exchange Commission."
Apart from the foregoing broad based changes affecting the
rehabilitation cases the Commission also modified substantive law.
The limitation imposed by the Commission Bill on the enforceability of clauses in contracts and unexpired leases providing for their
ipso facto termination where one of the parties resorts to or is forced
into some form of bankruptcy have been discussed. 0 Another substantive modification is concerned with the right under current law
of a bank holding a deposit account to set-off mutual debts immediately following the filing of a petition in bankruptcy by the debtor.9
The exercise of this right in business rehabilitation cases has frequently had the effect of virtually aborting the case at the outset
by depriving the business of the cash it needs to continue operations
and preserve going concern values.
The Commission proposes that the filing of a rehabilitation
case shall operate as an automatic stay of set-off by a depository
bank pending a ruling by the court. 2 In those instances where the
stay is continued the bank would have to be granted either a lien
or a priority in any plan that the debtor proposes to protect the
bank's possessory interests. The Judges' Bill is not greatly dissimilar in this respect."3
The common practice of public utilities threatening to cut off
87.
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90.
91.
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11 U.S.C. § 665(a) (1970).
H.R. 31, §§ 7-107(c), -306(b).
H.R. 32, § 7-305(b).
See note 48 sUpra and accompanying text.
It U.S.C. § 108(a) (1970).
H.R. 31, § 7-204(a).
H.R. 32, § 4-716.

THRESHOLD OF CHANGE

19771

essential services to a business debtor for non-payment of prepetition bills and demanding immediate payment of such bills as a
condition to continued service has been a troublesome problem for
trustees and bankruptcy courts. The effect of such demands coerces
the granting of a priority which is not provided for in the Act. The
current solution to the problem is a court restraining order." The
Commission Bill provides a statutory solution; the bill contains a
provision prohibiting the cutting off of essential services."5 Payment
of post-petition services is, however, safeguarded in such cases. The
Judges' Bill has similar provisions."
V.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing constitutes some of the changes being proposed
to the Congress for a new bankruptcy system. It is not easy to
interest Congress in a task of this dimension. The hard underlying
spadework in forging a bill with 300 pages of concentrated detail,
however, was done by others for the Congress. Indeed, Congress was
given two complete bills with alternate proposals from which to
choose. Many knowledgeable and dedicated people are associated
with this rapidly growing field of bankruptcy. The subject has come
of age! It no longer has an identity problem as it did over the years.
Judiciary Sub-Committees in both the House and the Senate
have set up tight schedules for mark-up sessions that hopefully will
lead to early agreement and vote. Congressman Don Edwards of
California, Chairman of the House Sub-Committee handling these
bills stated that:
One of the major pieces of legislation the Sub-Committee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary will be considering in the 94th Congress is the long overdue
reform of the bankruptcy laws of the United States. This legislation will have a significant impact on the credit economy of
the country, and deserves serious and extended study and
consideration .",
Indeed it will! We may all rejoice at the prospect.
94. Bankruptcy judges have the authority under the Act to "make such process, and
enter such judgements, in addition to those specifically provided for, as may be necessary
for enforcement of this [Actl." 1 U.S.C. § 11(a)(15) (1970). They also have the general
authority of federal courts to "issue writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions ..
" 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970).
95. H.R. 31, § 7-105.
96. H.R. 32, § 4-711.
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